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Abstract
The idea that to perceive an object is to perceive its
affordances—that is, the interactions of the perceiver with
the world that the object supports or affords—is attractive
from the point of view of theories in cognitive science
that emphasize the fundamental role of actions in repre-
senting an agent’s knowledge about the world. However,
in this general form, the notion has so far lacked a formal
expression. This paper offers a representation for objects
in terms of their affordances using Linear Dynamic Event
Calculus, a formalism for reasoning about causal relations
over events. It argues that a representation of this kind,
linking objects to the events which they are characteris-
tically involved in, underlies some universal operations
of natural language syntactic and semantic composition
that are postulated in Combinatory Categorial Grammar
(CCG). These observations imply that the language fac-
ulty is more directly related to prelinguistic cognitive ap-
paratus used for planning action than formal theories in
either domain have previously seemed to allow.
Introduction
The notion of an affordance (Gibson 1966) has in its
most basic sense of an invariant supporting perception
been extremely helpful in directing attention to non-
obvious properties of the sensory array relevant to visual
and haptic perception, and motor control (Lee 1980; Tur-
vey 1990). In its more general sense of an interaction
with the world that a perceived object mediates (Gibson
1979) it has proved equally attractive to a wide range
of theoretical positions that have emphasized the funda-
mental role of the notion of action in human cognition
(Norman 1988, 1999). This is the sense in which a door
“affords” egress and ingress, a knife affords cutting and
scraping, and the like. The attraction of this notion is
that it seems to offer a way in which perceptual learning
can be linked to the goals and actions upon the environ-
ment of the learner, an idea that has been followed up by
E. Gibson and Spelke (1983), among others. However,
its influence in these domains has been limited by two
difficulties.
One has been the controversial idea of “direct percep-
tion”. This is the idea that the perception that a mail-
box “ affords letter-mailing to a letter-writing human in
a community with a postal system” (Gibson 1979, p.139,
citing Gibson 1950) is as directly related to properties of
the sensory array as time-to-impact is to characteristics
of the optic flow field for a diving gannet. It is certainly
hard to believe that the perception of such affordances
is “direct” in this strong sense, although recognition of
mailboxes, like that of everything else, is undoubtedly
mediated in part by such Gibsonian invariants of the op-
tic array as relative spatial frequency spectra, and acqui-
sition of the mailbox artefact concept unquestionably de-
pends upon the association of such invariants with af-
fordances in the more general sense. I shall ignore the
perceptual aspect of affordances here.
A more serious obstacle to the exploitation of the idea
of affordances in this general sense has stemmed from
the very fact that many such affordances are actions or
events. A formal theory of events in their relation to ob-
jects that is applicable to such perceptual categorization
and/or conceptual representation of artefact concepts—
that is, a theory of what the affordance itself actually is,
and how it actually works as a basis for effective action
in the world—has been lacking.
The Linear Dynamic Event Calculus
The Linear Dynamic Event Calculus (LDEC) combines
the insights of the Event Calculus of Kowalski and Ser-
got (1986), itself a descendant of the Situation Calculus
of McCarthy and Hayes (1969) and the STRIPS planner
of Fikes and Nilsson (1971), with the Dynamic and Lin-
ear Logics that were developed by Harel (1984), Girard
(1987) and others.
Dynamic logics are a form of modal logic in which the
2 and 3 modalities are relativized to particular events.
For example, if a (possibly nondeterministic) program
or command α computes a function F over the integers,
then we may write the following:
(1) n 0) [α](y = F(n))
(2) n 0) hαi(y = F(n))
The intended meaning of the first of these is “in any sit-
uation in which n  0, after every execution of α that
terminates, y = F(n)”. That of the second is (dually) that
“in any situation in which n 0, there is an execution of
α that terminates with y = F(n)”.
We can think of these modalities as defining a logic
whose models are Kripke diagrams in which accessi-
bility between possible worlds is represented by events.
Such events can be defined as mappings between situ-
ations or partially specified possible worlds, defined in
terms of conditions on the antecedent which must hold
for them to apply (such as that n  0 in (1)), and conse-
quences (such as that y = F(n)) that hold in the conse-
quent.
The particular dynamic logic that we are dealing with
here is one that includes the following dynamic axiom,
which says that the operator ; is sequence, an operation
related to functional composition over events, viewed as
functions from situations to situations:
(3) [α][β]P) [α;β]P
Using this notation, we can conveniently represent, say,
a plan for getting outside as the composition of push-
ing a door and then going through it, written push0;go-
through0.
Composition is one of the most primitive combina-
tors, or operations combining functions, which Curry
and Feys (1958) call B. It can be defined by the fol-
lowing equivalence with a lambda term:
(4) Bαβ λs:α(βs)
Plans like push0;go-through0 could be written in Curry’s
notation as Bpush0go-through0
Situation/Event Calculi and the Frame
Problem
The situation calculi are heir to a problem known in
the AI literature as the Frame Problem (McCarthy and
Hayes 1969). This problem arises because the way that
we structure our knowledge of change in the world is in
terms of event-types that can be characterized (mostly) as
affecting just a few fluents among a very large collection
representing the state of the world. (Fluents are facts or
propositions that are subject to change). Naive event rep-
resentations which map entire situations to entire other
situations are therefore representationally redundant and
inferentially inefficient. A good representation of affor-
dances must get around this problem.
To avoid the frame problem in both its representational
and inferential aspects, we need a new form of logical
implication, distinct from the standard or intuitionistic
) we have used up till now. We will follow Bibel et al.
(1989) and others in using linear logical implication −
rather than intuitionistic implication) in those rules that
change the value of fluents.
For example, we can represent events involving doors
in a world (simplified for purposes of exposition) in
which there are two places out and in separated by a door
which may be open or shut, as follows:1
(5) a. shut(x)− [push(y;x)]open(x)
b. open(x)− [push(y;x)]shut(x)
1We follow a logic programming convention that all vari-
ables appearing in the consequent are implicitly universally
quantified and all other variables are implicitly existentialy
quantified. Since in the real world doors don’t always open
when you push them, box must be read as default necessity,
meaning “usually”.
(6) a. in(y)− [go-through(y;x)]out(y)
b. out(y)− [go-through(y;x)]in(y)
Linear implication has the effect of building into the rep-
resentation the update effects of actions—that once you
apply the rule, the proposition in question is “used up”,
and cannot take part in any further proofs, while a new
fact is added. The formulae therefore say that if some-
thing is shut and you push it, it becomes open (and vice
versa), and that if you are in and you go through some-
thing then you become out (and vice versa).
To interpret linear implication as it is used here in
terms of proof theory and proof search, we need to think
of possible worlds as states of a single updatable STRIPS
database of facts. Rules like (5) and (6) can then be
interpreted as (partial) functions over the states in the
model that map states to other states by removing facts
and adding other facts. Linear implication and the dy-
namic box operator are here essentially used as a single
state-changing operator: you can’t have one without the
other.
The effect of such systems can be exemplified as fol-
lows. If the initial situation is that you are in and the door
is shut:
(7) in(you)^door(d)^ shut(d)
—then the linear rules (5) mean that an attempt to prove
the proposition in (8) concerning the state of the door in
the situation that results from pushing the door will fail
because rule (5a) has removed the fact in question from
the database that results from the action push(you;d):2
(8) [push(you;d)]shut(d)
On the other hand, attempts to prove the following will
all succeed, since they are all facts in the database that
results from the action push(you;d) in the initial situation
(7):
(9) a. [push(you;d)]open(d)
b. [push(you;d)]door(d)
c. [push(you;d)]in(you)
The advantage of interpreting linear implication in this
way is that it builds the STRIPS treatment of the frame
problem (Fikes and Nilsson 1971) into the proof the-
ory, and entirely avoids the need for inferentially cum-
bersome reified frame axioms of the kind proposed by
Kowalski (1979) and many others (see Shanahan 1997).
Using linear implication (or the equivalent rewriting
logic devices or state update axioms of Thielscher (1999)
and Martı´-Oliet and Meseguer (1999)) for STRIPS-like
rules makes such frame axioms unnecessary. Instead,
they are theorems concerning the linear logic represen-
tation.
Even in this extremely simplified world, we need a
little more apparatus to represent our knowledge about
doors in a way which will allow us to make plans in-
2We follow the logic programming convention of negation
by failure, according to which a proposition is treated as false
if it cannot be positively proved to be true.
volving them. We also need to state preconditions on
the actions of pushing and going through. Here ordinary
non-linear intuitionistic implication is appropriate:3
(10) a. door(x)^open(x)
) possible(go-through(y;x))
b. door(x)) possible(push(y;x))
These rules say (oversimplifying wildly) that if a thing is
a door and is open then it’s possible to go through it, and
that if a thing is a door then it’s possible to push it.
We also need to define the transitive property of the
possibility relation, as follows, using the definition (3) of
event sequence composition:
(11) possible(α)^ [α]possible(β)) possible(α;β)
This says that any situation in which it is possible to α,
and in which actually doing α gets you to a situation
where it is possible to β, is a situation in which it is pos-
sible to α then β.
If we regard actions as functions from situations to sit-
uations, then this rule defines function composition as the
basic plan-building operator of the system. Composition
is one of the simplest of a small collection of combi-
nators which Curry and Feys (1958) used to define the
foundations of the λ-calculus and other applicative sys-
tems in which new concepts can be defined in terms of
old. Since the knowledge representation that underlies
human cognition and human language could hardly be
anything other than an applicative system of some kind,
we should not be surprised to see it turn up as one of the
basic operations of planning systems.
This fragment gives us a simple planner in which start-
ing from the world (12) in which you are in, and the door
is shut and stating the goal (13) meaning “find a possi-
ble series of actions that will get you out,” can, given a
suitable search control, be made to automatically deliver
a constructive proof that one such plan is (14), the com-
position of pushing, and going through, the door:
(12) in(you)^door(d)^ shut(d)
(13) possible(α)^ [α]out(you)
(14) α = push(you;d);go-through(you;d).
One way to produce this proof, which is suggested as
an exercise, is via backward-chaining from the goal (13)
on the consequents of rules (10) using the transitivity rule
(11). The situation that results from executing this plan in
the start situation (7) is one in which the following con-
junction of facts is directly represented by the database:
(15) out(you)^door(d)^open(d)
This calculus is developed further in Steedman 1997,
2002 in application to more ambitious plans, such as the
“monkey and bananas” problem, and a number of gener-
3The version of linear logic mixing linear and standard im-
plication is is closely related to “Bunched Implication Logic”
(see Pym 2001, which gives an extensive treatment of its se-
mantics and proof theory, including a cut elimination theorem).
alizations of the frame problem, using on a novel anal-
ysis of durative events extending over intervals of time,
which are ignored here.
However, we have said nothing yet about the problem
of search implicit in searching for and identifying such
plans.
Formalizing Affordance using LDEC
Although the example is simplified for purposes of expo-
sition (in particular, with respect to the problem of dura-
tivity), it provides the basis for a quite general calculus
of events. (See Shanahan (1997), Thielscher 1999, and
Steedman (1997, 2000b) for related proposals including
discussions of ramification, qualification, delayed action,
simultaneity, nondeterminism and other standard prob-
lems that such representations have to deal with.)
In fact the representation of actions and events in terms
of an association of preconditions and consequences with
the core event is a very generally applicable one. If the
precondition is a conditional stimulus such as a light, and
the consequence is a reward, such as food, while the ac-
tion concerned is pecking or pressing a bar, then it can be
considered as a representation of an operant in the cogni-
tive sense of Rescorla and Wagner (1972), itself a notion
closely related to that of an affordance.
It also provides the basis for a formalization of the re-
lation between objects and their affordances, of the kind
that we need in order to talk about perceptual and cogni-
tive learning in non-linguistic animals and prelinguistic
children. For example, the facts in (5) and (6) strike me
as a pretty good representation of what my cat knows
about the affordances of doors. Of course, the represen-
tation is perfectly neutral concerning the invariants that
afford the perception of doors in the first place, their re-
lation to bodily properties like the size of the cat’s head,
and aspects relevant to learning such as motor embed-
ding of the actions of pushing and going through, and
so on. It is a representation of what sort of thing it is
that is perceived and learned. Nevertheless, the repre-
sentation could be used to explain the transition she made
in her perceptual learning from a stage where doors af-
forded her (6) (going through for purposes of egress and
ingress) but not (5) (pushing to open and close), homing
in via a set of superstitious and rapidly extinguishing spu-
rious affordances to a correct affordance (5) supporting
the motor plan (14) and its internalization as yet another
affordance of doors. The representation also suggests
a basis for experimentally investigating precise details
of the cat’s representation of the affordances of doors.
(For example, do they afford her the ingress and egress
of other cats?) Many of these experiments have already
been done—most notably, by Ko¨hler (1925), in his in-
vestigations of tool use and planning in Chimpanzees.
One of Ko¨hler’s most thought-provoking observations
concerning such planning was the following. A chim-
panzee which was perfectly capable of consistently us-
ing a tool such as a stick to reach otherwise unattain-
able objects—one to whom sticks afforded reaching—
was unable to enact such a plan unless the stick was ac-
tually present in the problem situation. Mere availability
of a stick in an adjoining room—even one which the ape
had recently explored—was not enough to trigger the rel-
evant knowledge and cause the ape to fetch the stick.
This observation suggests that for non-linguistic ani-
mals, including those closest to us in evolutionary terms,
access to the affordances of objects is tied to immediate
perception of the objects themselves, as Gibson believed.
For an animal, this is quite a good way of running your
planner. If you don’t have much control over your phys-
ical environment, it is probably better to look at those
plans the situation affords, rather than backward chain-
ing to conditions that there may be no way for you to
satisfy, say because of the time of year. This in turn sug-
gests, uncontroversially, that affordances like egress are
indexed in such animals by object-concepts like door,
rather than by end-states like being out, and that plan-
ning proceeds reactively by forward chaining from what
is the case, rather than backward chaining from the goal.
We can represent such indexing by first defining ac-
tions like pushing and going through as functions like
the following derived from (5) and (6):
(16) a. push(y;x) ;

shut(x)− open(x)
open(x)− shut(x)

b. go-through(y;x) ;

in(y)− out(y)
out(y)− in(y)

(Here ; reads as “yields”. The linear implication sym-
bol − is overloaded to signify linear mapping of state
to state accompanied by deletion and addition of facts.
Implication is so closely related to functional mapping,
and the functions in question are so closely related to the
state update or rewrite axioms of the proof theory that
this overloading seems unlikely to cause confusion.)
The set of such functions Affordances(door) consti-
tutes the affordances of doors:
(17) Affordances(door) =

push
go-through

The Gibsonian affordance-based door-schema door0
can then in turn be defined as a function mapping doors
into (second-order) functions from their affordances like
pushing and going-through to their results:
(18) door0 = λxdoor:λpAffordances(door):px
The operation of turning an object of a given type into
a function over those functions that apply to objects of
that type is another primitive combinator called T or type
raising. As in the case of composition (4), the effect of
this combinator can be defined by equivalence to the cor-
responding λ-term:
(19) Tx  λp:px
Accordingly, (18) can be rewritten:
(20) door0 = λxdoor:Tx
Such a concept of doors is useful for reactive planning,
and one can add more affordances to Affordances(door)
as one’s experience increases. It seems quite likely that
this is close to the way cats or at least chimpanzees con-
ceptualize doors.
However, in human terms it is a somewhat stultifying
representation, in that it restricts the concept to previ-
ously encountered events involving doors that one has
somehow stumbled across. One would like to have the
advantages in terms of efficiency of planning that think-
ing of objects in terms of their affordances allows, while
also being able envisage novel uses for doors—for ex-
ample, using one as a table, or as a raft—when circum-
stances demand it. In other words, one would like to be
able to generalize (18) over a wider range of affordances,
such as the affordances of natural kinds such as flat mov-
able objects, or of other things that you can push and/or
go through. However, there are reasons to think our
ability to generalize very far beyond natural kinds and
directly experienced affordances is quite limited. (For
example, people find considerable difficulty in solving
those irritating conundrums which require one to see that
a pair of pliers affords the weight for a plumbline, or that
the box that thumbtacks are packaged in affords a bracket
that can be thumbtacked to the wall to provide a support
for a candle.) It seems likely that the basis for such lim-
ited generalization is partly perceptual, and partly em-
bedded in our modes of interaction with objects, as Gib-
son insisted.
Combinatory systems that include both composition
and type raising are quite expressive—see Smullyan
(1985, 1994) for discussion. They have the character
of calculi for rebracketing and permuting terms in ex-
pressions. Such calculi are closely related to linear logic
itself—see Lambek (1988) for discussion. In this con-
nection it is interesting that the theory of Combinatory
Categorial Grammar (CCG, Ades and Steedman 1982,
Steedman 2000a) implies that the grammar of all lan-
guages involves both type-raising of argument categories
and composition of predicates.
Combinatory Grammars
CCG, like other varieties of Categorial Grammar, is a
theory in which all linguistic elements are categorized
or typed as either functions or basic types, and in which
syntactic derivation is achieved by syntactic rules corre-
sponding to directionally and categorially restricted ver-
sions of a small number of combinators prominently in-
cluding composition B and T. Thus it is a theory that
makes language look as if it has been built on a pre-
existing sytem for planning action in the world, and
thereby seem less unique as a cognitive faculty than is
usually assumed.
While readers must be directed elsewhere for a full
presentation, it may suffice for present purposes to
merely note that in CCG elements like verbs are asso-
ciated with a syntactic “category” which identifies them
as functions, and specifies the type and directionality of
their arguments and the type of their result. For example,
a ditransitive verb (DTV) is a function from (indirect ob-
ject) NPs on the right into transitive verbs (TV)—that is,
into functions from (direct object) NPs on the right into
VP:4
(21) give := (VP=NP)=NP
Such a DTV is a (curried) function that can apply to its
arguments to yield VP, as follows:
(22) give Bill a biscuit
(VP=NP)=NP NP NP
>
VP=NP
>
VP
However, the involvement of further combinatory op-
erations engenders a wide variety of coordination phe-
nomena characteristic of all languages of the world, in-
cluding English “argument-cluster coordination”, “back-
ward gapping” and verb-raising constructions in Ger-
manic languages, and English gapping. The first of
these is illustrated by the following analysis, from Dowty
(1988):
(23) give Bill a biscuit and Harry an apple
<T <T <T <T
DTV TVnDTV VPnTV CONJ TVnDTV VPnTV
<B <B
VPnDTV VPnDTV
<Φ>
VPnDTV
<
VP
The type-raising and composition rules, indicated by T
and B repectively, guarantee that the semantics of non
standard constituents like Bill a biscuit is such as to re-
duce appropriately with a ditransitive verb like give. It
is in fact a prediction of the theory that such a construc-
tion can exist in English, and its inclusion in the grammar
requires no additional mechanism whatsoever.
The earlier papers show that no other non-constituent
coordinations of dative-accusative NP sequences are al-
lowed in any language with the English verb categories,
given the assumptions of CCG. Thus the following are
ruled out in principle, rather than by stipulation:
(24) a. *Bill to Sue and introduce Harry to George
b. *Introduce to Sue Bill and to George Harry
Examples like (23) have often been described in terms
of very powerful mechanisms of “deletion under iden-
tity” of missing elements like the verb give in the right
conjunct. However, unlike CCG, such proposals fail to
explain the observation that such deletions preserve word
order, in the sense that in both coordinate and canonical
sentences of English, verbs are to the left of their com-
plements.
This observation is merely the English specific mani-
festation of a generalization concerning Universal gram-
mar, due to Ross (1970), who noted that when verbs are
“deleted” in this way in languages with other “basic”
word orders, such as verb-final (SOV) and verb initial
4We here use the “result leftmost” notation in which a
rightward-combining functor over a domain β into a range α
are written α=β, while the corresponding leftward-combining
functor is written αnβ. (α and β may themselves be function
categories.) There is an alternative “result on top” notation,
according to which the latter category is written βnα.
(VSO) languages, they always do so in a way that pre-
serves the canonical left-to-right ordering of verb and ar-
gument, thus:5
(25) VSO: *SO and VSO VSO and SO
SOV: SO and SOV *SOV and SO
Logical and Neurological Relations between
Language and Action
The ubiquitous appearance of composition B and type-
raising T in both affordance-mediated action planning of
the most elementary sort on the one hand, and univer-
sal grammar on the other, strongly suggests that the lan-
guage faculty in its syntactic aspect is directly hung onto
a more primitive set of prelinguistic operations including
these combinators, originally developed for motor plan-
ning. This hypothesis has strong implications for the the-
ory of evolution and the child’s acquisition of language,
for which there is considerable circumstantial evidence
from neurological and neuroanatomical observations.
The Linear-Dynamic Event Calculus and related lin-
ear and STRIPS-like systems offer a way of represent-
ing actions in ways that are useful for planning action.
This in turn offers a way of capturing affordances of ob-
jects, a notion that is relevant to doing so efficiently, and
which is therefore relevant to perceptual categorization
and concept learning relevant to tool-use. Two combi-
natory operations of composition and type-raising play
a central role in this process. Those same combinators
appear in syntactic guise in natural language, where they
provide the basis for an explanatory account of language-
specific constructions and cross-linguistic universal gen-
eralization, and where a considerable body of evidence
from neuroanatomy and child development that has been
adduced in support of the Motor Theory suggests that
planning and language are closely related. LDEC and
CCG make that relation look direct enough to explain the
fact that the evolutionary advance in question appears to
have been very rapid indeed.
It is interesting to speculate upon what such an evo-
lutionary step might be based. One strong candidate is
the attainment of the modal and propositional attitude
concepts that are necessary to support a theory of other
minds—that is, functions over propositional entities.
(We have so far glossed over an important distinction
between plans, which compose actions of type state !
state, and grammar, which composes functions of type
proposition! proposition or property! property.)
It is propositional functions that induce true recursion
in both conceptual structures and grammar. There is no
evidence that apes entertain such concepts. In particular,
the most successful attempts to teach apes to use lan-
guage, notably those involving ASL and other manipula-
tive languages, show a lack of recursive syntax coupled
5Interestingly, SVO languages like English pattern with
verb initial languages in this respect, rather than with verb final.
This fact and certain apparent exceptions to Ross’s generaliza-
tion arising in languages with more than one “basic” word order
are discussed in Steedman 2000a.
with an almost autistic paucity of conversational initia-
tive. Perhaps it is only the lack a theory of mind and
the associated propositional attitude concepts that holds
apes back from developing human language on the basis
of their planning abilities, a suggestion consistent with
the views of Tomasello 1999.
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